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Abstract 
What are we justified in asserting when constructing an ontology of time? I believe a version of 
Presentism to be the only justified theory. ‘Justified’ here refers exclusively to a basis of empirical 
and epistemological evidence. What can we assert about the metaphysics of time when we start 
from a justificationist epistemology? Putnam and Rietdijk argue that the relativity of simultaneity 
supports Eternalism. My investigation examines the strength of justification Eternalism attains from 
the special theory of relativity (STR) and will argue that Eternalism is not justified by STR. I will also 
suggest that an alternative metaphysical theory of time, Point Presentism, attains justification from 
STR. 
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1.0 Introduction  
1.1 Grounding Question 
The question that grounds this investigation concerns what we are justified in asserting when 
constructing an ontology of time. I believe a version of Presentism to be the only justified theory. 
‘Justified’ here refers exclusively to a basis of empirical and epistemological evidence. What can we 
assert about the metaphysics of time when justifying from epistemology? Putnam and Rietdijk argue 
that the relativity of simultaneity supports Eternalism. My investigation will examine the strength of 
justification Eternalism attains from the special theory of relativity (STR). I will also suggest that an 
alternative metaphysical theory of time, Point Presentism, is justified by STR. The same line of 
reasoning employed by those who endorse Eternalism is shown to actually provided justification for 
Point presentism.  
1.2 Ontologies of Time  
The two theories of time that concern this investigation are Presentism and Eternalism. Presentism 
is the metaphysical position asserting everything actual that exists is located at the present. Nothing 
actual is located at a different point in actual time. The past and future do not contain entities that 
exist. If you were to assemble everything that actually exists then you would have a collection of 
present events, objects and properties. Eternalism, in contrast to Presentism, asserts that there is 
more than one actual temporal location. The different temporal locations are those which are earlier 
and later than the present. Nothing is entailed from the object’s existence to its temporal location. If 
the object in question exists then it has a temporal location that is not necessarily present; that 
which has been and that which will be is the same as that which is, insofar as existence goes. 
Objective becoming and dynamism are rejected by the eternalist but essential to the presentist 
position. Objective becoming is the creation of the actual existence. The reality of objects is attained 
at the present. Prior to this, there is no such object. The manifestation of actual objects is a feature 
of the world; objects exist depending on temporal location. Dynamism is the flow that time has 
which for the presentist is an objective feature of time.  
Although Presentism and Eternalism hold true to the descriptions expressed above it would be 
wrong to assert that there is consensus concerning every feature of the theories. There are many 
different versions of both Presentism and Eternalism. Eternalism is best categorised as four 
dimensional space-time. The universe is a static four-dimensional block lacking a shifting present 
with all times and events located at each time being equally real. (Dainton, 2001, p. 27) This is the 
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standard understanding of Eternalism. All dynamic and flowing aspects to time are rejected. The 
impression of time’s flow is not of an objective feature of the universe. What is called ‘present’ is 
simply a single static temporal location determined by an observer; each observer is capable of 
determining what is present for them. What we perceive as a flowing present is a mentally 
constructed phenomenon; the experience of a single static time as a part of a series one after the 
other creating some illusion of dynamism. This is similar to the way a flip book appears to portray 
motion whereas in fact it is simply a number of static images stacked one after the other. Observing 
one static image followed by another static image can create the illusion of dynamism. Additionally, 
ideas of becoming are also rejected. No events come into existence as everything that will exist does 
exist. This is to assert that the future does not become real at the present. The realisation of things 
cannot occur as everything is already real.  
An individual who wants to maintain that time flows and that the notion of becoming is an objective 
matter is not necessarily excluded from the eternalist camp. The fundamental requirement is an 
objective attribute associated with the passage of time. The ‘moving spotlight theory’ is a hybrid 
theory that permits this. The dynamic flow of time is akin to a light shining on events as they are 
‘present’. It was first expressed by Broad (Broad, 1923), 
‘We are naturally tempted to regard the history of the world as existing eternally in a certain 
order of events. Along this, and in a fixed direction, we imagine the characteristic of 
presentness as moving, somewhat like the spot of light from a policeman’s bull’s-eye 
traversing the fronts of the houses in a street. What is illuminated is the present, what has 
been illuminated is the past, and what has not yet been illuminated is the future’ (Broad, 
1923, pp. 59-60) 
In contrast to this particular eternalist matter, Presentism in all forms is committed to objective 
becoming and dynamism. Events that come into the present were previously non-existent. This 
becoming, regardless of the extent that events and objects remain in existence, is sufficient to 
constitute objective becoming. Most Presentists do not find issue with objective becoming or 
dynamism in time but instead assert this as a positive feature of their doctrine. The internal conflict 
between presentists when concerned with the implications of STR arises from what constitutes the 
present. Varying versions of Presentism construe the present in different forms. The nature of these 
variations is usually the result of attempting to offer a version of Presentism that is compatible with 
STR. To explain them here before explaining STR would be unhelpful. Some of the different varieties 
of Presentism will appear later in the investigation and will be given attention at that point. 
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STR is the driving factor in much of the discussion concerning theories of time. The general theme 
follows the following dialectic: a position will be presented that incorporates some desirable aspects, 
such as becoming or dynamic time and then receive opposition on the grounds that it is not 
compatible with STR. Presentism is often subject to this dialectic as it preserves both of these 
aspects. It is not restricted to Presentism either. The moving spotlight theory faces opposition on the 
grounds that it is incompatible with STR. Skow (Skow, 2009) defends the moving spotlight theory in 
the same way many presentists have done when defending Presentism. This highlights how the 
debate, when concerned with justification from physics, is not exclusively between Presentism and 
Eternalism but is between Eternalism and all other theories. This is because Eternalism is argued to 
be the result of justifying from STR and is repeatedly claimed to be the only theory compatible with 
STR. Most importantly for this investigation, it is often claimed to be the only justified theory. 
Putnam (Putnam, Time and Physical Geometry, 1967) comes to one of the most sweeping 
conclusions when arguing for the block universe and against Presentism, 
‘I conclude that the problem of the reality and the determinateness of future events is now 
solved. Moreover, it is solved by physics and not by philosophy. We have learned that we 
live in a four-dimensional and not a three-dimensional world, and that space and time or, 
better, space-like separations and time-like separations are just two aspects of a single four-
dimensional continuum with a peculiar metric which sometimes permits distance (y, x) = 0 
even when x ≠ y. Indeed, I do not believe that there are any longer any philosophical 
problems about Time’ (Putnam, Time and Physical Geometry, 1967, p. 247)  
Putnam’s conclusion not only strongly endorses the block universe theory but effectively decides 
that the discussion concerning time is concluded. He rejects that philosophical discourse was the 
driving factor in reaching such a conclusion, instead declaring that physics has given us a justified 
theory of time. Putnam’s rejection of philosophical discourse is contradictory. His paper is one of 
philosophy and not physics. He suggests through logical argument that Eternalism is the correct 
theory. Even if it is accepted that physics provides justification for a theory of time it can only be 
shown through philosophical discourse. Rejecting the part that philosophy has to play would result 
in no ontological position of time being justified. Rejecting philosophy would involve rejecting the 
reasoning used by Putnam to endorse Eternalism. Putnam’s work will become clearer as the 
investigation progresses but first more groundwork is required. Notably, expressing how 
Justificationism fits into the picture and giving a comprehensive explanation of the relevant aspects 
of physics. 
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1.3 Justificationism  
Justificationism is the philosophical doctrine asserting that one should believe only what one could 
have justification for. A belief should be adopted only if there is sufficient justification for its 
adoption or if it is possible for this to be the case. An example of this can be found in Dummett 
(Dummett, 2004). Dummett’s discussion concerns a range of statements and involves a substantial 
semantical element that is not necessary for adopting justificationism but his version is provided to 
give an example of how justificationism can be employed. In the statement, ‘The chair exists’, the 
speaker is referring to an objective object. The term ‘chair’ refers to the object denoted as ‘chair’. 
The reality of an object is determined by the truth value assigned to a corresponding statement 
about its existence. Dummett maintains that a statement has meaning only if a truth value can be 
assigned to it. If it is not possible to make such a truth evaluation then the statement is meaningless. 
Statements where it is possible to assign a truth value are the only ones that have meaning. Those 
statements that have meaning connect to ontology.  
If there is sufficient justification for holding the belief, ‘x exists’ then the statement, ‘x exists’ is true. 
As this statement is true it follows that the object that x refers to exists. If there is not sufficient 
justification for holding the belief then the statement, ‘x exists’ is not true and therefore it cannot be 
that x exists. If it is possible to assign a truth value to the statement, ‘x is bright’ then it follows that x 
must exist; being able to assign a truth value to this statement entails that x must exist. The 
justificationist doctrine places an empirical requirement on the metaphysical outcomes; an inability 
to justify results in something that should not be believed which is not to say whether it should be 
disbelieved. As our justification is one that starts from empirical evidence, something should be 
accepted as true only if it is justified on this basis. Relevant to our discussion of time are the results 
from modern physics. Physics is based in empirical verification and testing.  
It should be noted that the version of justificationism outlined above holds a strong connection with 
semantics. Dummett or any other semantical considerations are in no way entailed along with the 
adoption of justificationism and he is included here to give and example of a justificationist 
approach. Justificationism should be understood in the sense of holding a belief because there is 
evidence for holding that belief. Most importantly for this investigation is the notion that beliefs that 
are impossible to justify should not be held. In addition, it is not the case that all Eternalists are 
motived by justificationist reasons.  
Holding a particular belief is justified when there is evidence that supports holding such a belief. 
Evidence can be found from empirical data. The belief concerning the existence of a certain object is 
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justified because there is empirical information that provides justification for holding said belief.  
More exposition of the relevant aspects of justificationism employed in this thesis can be found in 
later in the paper (Sections 3.0 and 3.1). It is important to note here that I in no way am endorsing 
the adoption of justificationism. Justificationism is held independently of the argument that I am 
putting forward. It is an assumption that I do not justify but I am assuming results from the debate. 
The individual who is sympathetic to justificationism should also take the considerations resultant 
from STR found in this paper (such as those later proposed in the Putnam-Stein debate) to also 
support the conclusions.  
The lines between what is the exclusive domain of physics and philosophy are blurred. This 
philosophical investigation is concerned with the conclusions that have been drawn from physics 
and used to express STR; the extent to which this is the concern of philosophers or physicists in 
unclear. To offer a distinctive and clear boundary between what is physics and what is philosophy 
would be difficult. Both parties would disagree on where to draw the line. This is clearly illustrated in 
this investigation; work from both philosophers and physicists are relevant here. Putnam rejected 
philosophy in his argument and essentially deemed the ontological construction of time as an issue 
for physics. As was shown previously, he was clearly overstepping himself. Instead of drawing such 
strict boundaries, an interwoven and overlapping interpretation will suffice. It makes no difference 
to this investigation if it is the concern of philosopher or physicist. If logic and reasoning are 
implemented to arrive at a conclusion then a philosopher can intervene; much of what is said 
concerning the justification of time is built on logical and rational discourse leaving much room for a 
philosopher to get involved.   
1.4 Time and Physics 
1.4.1 Absolute and Relative Time 
To give a sufficiently detailed account it is instructive to start from Newton’s (Newton, 1687) 
position concerning time, absolutism. Absolutism entails that events which are taken to be 
simultaneous from one frame of reference are to be taken as simultaneous in all frames of 
reference. A frame of reference is a four dimensional coordinate system centred on a particular 
location from which spatial and temporal judgments can be made. According to absolutism, the 
temporal relations between events from one frame of reference will be in agreement with all other 
frames of reference:  
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‘All motions may be accelerated and retarded; but the true, or equable, progress of absolute 
time is liable to no change. The duration or perseverance of the existence of things remains 
the same, whether the motions are swift or slow, or none at all’ (Newton, 1687, pp. 78-79) 
Absolutism is in contention with Einstein’s (Einstein, 1916) work advocating relative temporal 
relations. Relativism is the view that events that are taken to be simultaneous from one frame of 
reference do not have to be taken as simultaneous in all frames of reference. Different frames of 
reference can produce conflicting but equally valid judgments on the simultaneity of events. Einstein 
bases his argument on physics, notably the consequences of the special theory of relativity. STR, as 
defined by him, is the theory that logically results from holding the principle of relativity and the 
principle of the constancy of light, as the following sections explain.  
1.4.2 Principle of Relativity  
The principle of relativity states that all equations describing the laws of physics have the same form 
regardless of the frame of reference they are applied from. Every accurate measurement from every 
frame of reference is equally valid. No one particular perspective on temporal aspects of the world is 
privileged. There can be no particular point in space or time that has precedence over another. 
(Einstein, The Foundation of the General Theory of Relativity, 1914-1917, p. 111) 
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1.4.3 The Constancy of Light 
When measuring the speed of light in a vacuum, it always travels at the same speed. This is 
regardless of the relative motion between the frame of reference and the location of light. If a car is 
stationary relative to your frame of reference and turns on its headlights, the speed of light coming 
from the headlights will be the same as when the car is moving relative to your frame of reference. If 
the car travels at half the speed of light (relative to your frame of reference) and switches on its 
headlights, the speed of light remains constant.   
A consequence of this is that the speed of light sets an upper limit for the speed that objects with 
mass can travel. No matter how fast an object is travelling, it can never surpass the speed of light. 
Light will always be travelling away from the object at the same speed; so no matter the speed of 
the object, it is impossible to overtake light. 
1.4.4 Minkowski Space-Time Diagrams 
The Minkowski space-time diagram (Figure 1.0) can express the spatio-temporal positions of objects 
and events from a particular frame of reference. The observer is located at the centre point. The rest 
of the picture expresses the spatio-temporal locations of other objects within that frame of 
reference. The vertical axis represents temporal position and the horizontal axis represents spatial 
position along a given dimension. If we take an absolute view of time, then the horizontal line along 
the centre of the diagram can represent the present, the upper half of the diagram its future and the 
lower half its past. This encompasses the extent of spatio-temporal relations in an absolute way. 
Absolutism can be expressed in this way. The present is a single horizontal line that extends 
uniformly across the spatial plane. For two events to be simultaneous with each other, they simply 
need to be located on the same horizontal line. The temporal relations between any two objects are 
absolute. 
The implications of relativity come into the diagram with the inclusion of two light cones. The 
diagonal lines are paths along which light would travel. They extend from the present and create two 
light cones, one into the past and the other into the future. As light sets the cosmic speed limit and 
because the photons of light are in the spatio-temporal locations they are, we can assert that only 
information from within the light cones is able to reach and be reached by the centre point. Nothing 
beyond the lower light cone is observable from the origin of the frame of reference depicted. The 
light cone signifies the limitations of possible perception. Nothing outside the light cone is able to 
reach the observer at that point. This creates two ‘dark zones’. These are areas where it is 
impossible for light to reach the observer. 
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Figure 1.0 – 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.5 Einstein and Simultaneity  
1.5.1 Einstein’s Definition of Simultaneity  
According to Einstein (Einstein, 1916), a definition of simultaneity must allow us in the present case 
to decide empirically whether two spatially separated events occurred simultaneously. Any attempts 
to attaching meaning to the term ‘simultaneity’ will be unsuccessful if this requirement is not 
satisfied. He proposes the following,   
‘Lightning has struck the rails on our railway embankment at two places A and B far distant 
from each other. I make the additional assertion that these two lightning flashes occurred 
simultaneously. If I ask you whether there is sense in this statement, you will answer my 
question with a decided "Yes." *… ] I cannot be satisfied with this answer for the following 
reason. Supposing that as a result of ingenious considerations an able meteorologist were to 
discover that the lightning must always strike the places A and B simultaneously, then we 
should be faced with the task of testing whether or not this theoretical result is in 
accordance with the reality. We encounter the same difficulty with all physical statements in 
which the conception "simultaneous" plays a part.’ (Einstein, 1916, p. 22) 
Einstein places only one requirement on a definition of simultaneity: in every actual case the 
definition must provide an empirical verdict on whether or not the concept which we are asking to 
be defined is satisfied. Under the right conditions two things are simultaneous when an observer 
asserts that they are, based on the direct evidence they have access to. Einstein continues, 
Temporal 
Plane 
Spatial Plane 
Light 
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‘The concept does not exist for the physicist until he has the possibility of discovering 
whether or not it is fulfilled in an actual case. We thus require a definition of simultaneity 
such that this definition supplies us with the method by means of which, in the present case, 
he can decide by experiment whether or not both the lightning strokes occurred 
simultaneously. As long as this requirement is not satisfied, I allow myself to be deceived as 
a physicist (and of course the same applies if I am not a physicist), when I imagine that I am 
able to attach a meaning to the statement of simultaneity’ (Einstein, 1916, p. 22) 
After making this point clear, Einstein suggests a method of testing simultaneity. We find the 
midpoint between the two positions of A and B by measuring along the track and then proceed to 
set up two mirrors at 90 degrees. Each mirror permits the direct observation of A and B at the same 
time. If the observer perceives both of the flashes of light at the same time it should be concluded 
that they are simultaneous. For this situation to result in simultaneity, the nature of light’s constancy 
must be knowable. To do this would require that we measure it but this could only be done if we 
already had a means of measuring time,  
‘Your definition would certainly be right, if only I knew that the light by means of which the 
observer at M perceives the lightning flashes travels along the length A M with the same 
velocity as along the length B M. But an examination of this supposition would only be 
possible if we already had at our disposal the means of measuring time. It would thus appear 
as though we were moving here in a logical circle.’ (Einstein, 1916, p. 23) 
This objection is rejected by Einstein because the nature of light is of no concern when defining 
simultaneity. Only one requirement needs to be met; that in every actual situation we must be able 
to come to an empirical decision as to whether or not the two events were simultaneous or not:  
‘That light requires the same time to traverse the path A M as for the path B M is in reality 
neither a supposition nor a hypothesis about the physical nature of light, but a stipulation 
which I can make of my own freewill in order to arrive at a definition of simultaneity.’ 
(Einstein, 1916, p. 23) 
By adopting this definition of simultaneity, it is possible to give precise meaning to the temporal 
location of as many events as desired. This, for Einstein, is a definition of time provided by physics. In 
this definition, he supposes that three clocks of identical construction are placed along the railway 
line at three points, A, B, and C. Each of the clocks is set in such a way that the positions of the hands 
are simultaneously identical. The time of an event is to be understood as the time presented by 
observation of one of the clocks in the same spatial location as the event. This results in a time value 
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capable of being observed in association with every event. Further, this definition results in the 
following: If two events belong to the same reference body then time ticks off at the same rate for 
each of these events: 
‘This stipulation contains a further physical hypothesis, the validity of which will hardly be 
doubted without empirical evidence to the contrary. It has been assumed that all these 
clocks go at the same rate if they are of identical construction. Stated more exactly: When 
two clocks arranged at rest in different places of a reference-body are set in such a manner 
that a particular position of the pointers of the one clock is simultaneous (in the above 
sense) with the same position, of the pointers of the other clock, then identical "settings" 
are always simultaneous (in the sense of the above definition).’ 
Einstein’s makes verificationist assumptions in his definition of simultaneity. The central 
requirement is direct observation. This condition alone is sufficient for an accurate assertion of 
simultaneity. An observation of any event confers the status of present to the entity. Additionally, 
two spatially separated events which are perceived at the same time are also simultaneous.  
1.5.2 Relativity of Simultaneity  
In taking the previous definition of simultaneity, Einstein arrives at the consequence that 
simultaneity must also be relative. Take the following similar example. Suppose that you, a are 
travelling on a train in motion (relative to the ground). You are standing at the centre of the train 
(stationary relative to the train). I, b am standing on the side of the tracks (stationary relative to the 
ground). As you are travelling past me, I am in motion relative to the train. Now, suppose that you, 
at the centre point of the train, arrive aligned with me. It is at this point that a light, L is switched on 
at the centre of the train. (Figure 1.1) 
Figure 1.1 - 
 
 
 
 
 
a 
b 
L 
Ground 
Train 
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We are both asked to judge which end of the train the light reaches first. As you are stationary 
relative to the train and because the speed of light is constant, you correctly assert that the light 
reaches each end of the train at the same time. However, as I am in motion relative to the train and 
because the speed of light is constant, I also correctly assert that the light reaches the back of the 
train first and then reaches the front. Relative motion between bodies of reference will produce 
different but equally valid claims on the simultaneity of events. The light reaching the back and front 
of the train is simultaneous from a frame of reference on the train and not simultaneous from a 
frame of reference off the train. Each frame of reference with a different relative motion has its own 
perspective on the temporal ordering of spatially separated events. If the location of the frame of 
reference is unspecified, then statements about when an event occurred are meaningless. (Einstein, 
1916, p. 26) 
Relative simultaneity leads to a rejection of absolute notions of time. It is no longer true that the 
state of motion that a ‘reference-body’ is in has no effect on the temporal location of an event. The 
notion of absolute time is incompatible with Einstein’s definition of simultaneity. Rejecting the 
assumption of absolute time allows for harmony between the constancy of light and the principle of 
relativity; hence relative time is adopted to produce a coherent theory.  
Einstein’s definition of simultaneity entails the relativity of simultaneity. From this, a new theory of 
time, Eternalism, has been argued to be the resultant theory. Putnam, Rietdijk and Penrose all offer 
endorsements of Eternalism based in the consequences of relative simultaneity. These 
endorsements are built upon physics and should be treated as justification from empirical evidence.  
1.6 Justified Eternalism 
1.6.1 Rietdijk and Eternalism 
Rietdijk provides a proof that everything called ‘present’ from one frame of reference has the 
possibility of being in the past in another frame of reference belonging to some distant observer. 
Take two observers perceiving from differing frames of reference. One of the observers is moving 
towards the other. Due to the relative motion between the two observers, their planes of 
simultaneity do not align (Figure 1.3). a, b, c, represent events located at the spatio-temporal 
locations depicted. Event a is simultaneous with b. Event b is simultaneous with event c. Event c is in 
the future of event a. c from the frame of reference b is as real as b is from frame of reference a. In 
virtue of the simultaneity between a b and b c, c is as real to a as b is for a. Every event has the 
possibility of being past to some distant observer. There can always be an observer sufficiently 
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spatially distant and travelling with sufficient relative motion that results with all events that you call 
‘present’ being past to another observer. (Rietdijk, 1966, p. 341) 
Figure 1.3 -       Simultaneity =  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.6.2 Penrose and Eternalism  
Penrose offers a similar line of reasoning. He proposes a paradox. Suppose two individuals walking 
past each other in the street on earth. Just outside of the Milky Way exists the Andromeda galaxy. Of 
our two walkers, one is walking towards the distant galaxy and the other away from it. Due to the 
vast distance between the observer and the event, the relatively small difference in relative motion 
greatly distorts what events are simultaneous according to each observer’s frame of reference. The 
individual’s walking away is simultaneous with a meeting of aliens debating whether or not to invade 
earth. The individual’s walking towards is simultaneous with the Andromedan invasion force already 
en route. Penrose questions how it can be possible for there to be uncertainty concerning this event 
and how two observers located at the same place offer such drastically differing accounts of what is 
occurring now. If the aliens have already decided to invade then how can there be any uncertainty 
over this? The event is concurrently in the determined past of one observer and in the uncertain 
future of the other. He writes: 
‘In fact neither of the people can yet know of the launching of the space fleet. They can 
know only later, when telescopic observations from earth reveal that the fleet is indeed on 
its way. Then they can hark back to that chance encounter, and come to the conclusion that 
at that time, according to one of them, the decision lay in the uncertain future, while to the 
a 
c 
b 
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other, it lay in the certain past. Was there then any uncertainty about that future? Or was 
the future of both people already "fixed"?’  (Penrose, 1989, pp. 392–393)  
The presentist has the problem of two observers disagreeing over what is present. The relativity of 
simultaneity results in the existence of contrasting presents. For a presentist to resolve this 
consequence, substantial revisions are required. Eternalism resolves this paradox because all 
temporal events, regardless of location, are equally real. For the observer walking towards 
Andromeda the invasion is present and exists along with the preceding events existing. For the 
observer walking away from Andromeda the invasion still exists but is not yet present.  
1.6.3 Putnam and Eternalism 
Putnam argues that events located in the future from one frame of reference must already exist. He 
makes four assumptions. The first three of which are the following, 
‘I. I-now am real. (Of course, this assumption changes each time I announce that I am 
making it, since 'I-now' refers to a different instantaneous "me.")  
II. At least one other observer is real, and it is possible for this other observer to be in 
motion relative to me. 
III. If it is the case that all and only the things that stand in a certain relation R to me-now are 
real, and you-now are also real, then it is also the case that all and only the things that stand 
in the relation R to you-now are real.’ (Putnam, Time and Physical Geometry, 1967, pp. 240-
241) 
The fourth assumption is the truth of STR, including the definition of simultaneity as presented by 
Einstein. Without assuming STR, a presentist account of time is clearly compatible with the other 
three assumptions. If the present is to constitute the relation of real things to me now exclusively, 
then it follows that everything simultaneous with me at the present is real and only those things. 
The same is true from your frame of reference. An absolute account of the simultaneity leaves 
everything, simultaneous with me, aligned with everything simultaneous with you. As everything 
and only those things that are simultaneous with me and you are found at the present, everything 
actual that exists is located at the present.  
Once STR is assumed, Putnam argues that events located in the future are real: 
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‘We now discover something really remarkable. Namely, on every natural choice of the 
relation R, it turns out that future things (or events) are already real’ (Putnam, Time and 
Physical Geometry, 1967, p. 242) 
He uses the following example to express this point. Both you and I are located in the same place but 
moving exceptionally fast relative to each other. Our world lines and planes of simultaneity are 
different because of the relative motion between us. To ensure that there are no privileged 
observers: 
‘We cannot take the relation of simultaneity-in-my-coordinate-system to be R without 
violating the way in which the principle that There Are No Privileged Observers is intended 
to be understood. Rather, we have to take R to be the relation of simultaneity-in-the-
observer's-coordinate-system’ (Putnam, Time and Physical Geometry, 1967, p. 242) 
Then assuming that at my now, every event and only those events are simultaneous with me are 
real, it follows that you at present are also real. All and only those events, in relation your plane of 
simultaneity, are also real. (Putnam, Time and Physical Geometry, 1967, p. 242) However, an 
accepted consequence of STR is that there are events located in the future from my frame of 
reference and these same events are located in the present from your frame of reference. The 
events I call future are simultaneous with you. You are simultaneous with me. Everything 
simultaneous with me at the present is real and only these events are real. As you are simultaneous 
with me, everything simultaneous with you is real. Therefore, reality has to be granted to those 
events that I call future. (Putnam, Time and Physical Geometry, 1967, p. 242) 
Additionally, if the present is defined outside a frame of reference, it is subject to Putnam’s 
objection places the present as privileged. STR designates no absolute simultaneity between events 
that belong to different reference bodies. Absolute simultaneity constitutes assigning the status of 
present to a set of events independent of any frame of reference. According to STR, no two spatially 
separate events can be simultaneous with each other independent of their frame of reference. The 
present can be constructed only from a frame of reference. Each plane of simultaneity is relative to 
its frame of reference. Presentists assign the present to a group of events that are not frame 
dependent. According to Putnam, the presentist’s understanding of the present gives it a privileged 
ontological status that is incompatible with STR. This part of Putnam’s argument poses STR as 
incompatible with Presentism and then concludes: when being forced to choose between 
Presentism and STR, we should side with STR, as it is a much more successful theory in physics and 
has empirical backing. (Bourne, 2006, p. 162) 
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1.7 Consequences for Presentism   
Presentism appears to have arrived in a particular predicament. STR, Einstein’s definition of 
simultaneity and the relativity of simultaneity together offer strong opposition to Presentism.  A 
presentist in this context has options.  The presentists fall into two broad camps when responding. 
The first group responds by rejecting one or more of the premises that lead to conclusion; such as 
rejecting some aspect of STR or Einstein’s definition of simultaneity. Examples of this can be found in 
Bourne (Bourne, 2006) who rejects the verificationist assumptions made by Einstein, allowing for a 
rejection of his definition of simultaneity. A reformulated version of simultaneity is also offered on 
presentist terms. Alternatively, Tooley (Tooley, 1997) accepts Einstein’s definition of simultaneity 
but rejects the constancy of light as defined in STR. Instead, light has differing speeds in different 
inertial frames of reference. What remains constant is the round-trip speed of light. As a result, the 
arguments for Eternalism are lacking a necessary premise. It should be noted that Tooley is not 
arguing in defence of Presentism but his defence could be adopted by Presentism. The other 
approach accepts the consequences presented by Putnam, Rietdijk and Penrose and attempts to 
construe a compatible presentist position. Examples of this can be found in Sklar (Sklar, 1977) who 
questions the transitive nature of simultaneity. As such, simultaneity from one frame of reference 
does not align with what is simultaneous from other frames of reference. This is required for the 
Eternalist endorsement. Additionally, Stein (Stein, On Einstein--Minkowski Space--Time, 1968) 
accepts an absolute nature of becoming and rejects any association concerning simultaneity 
between events outside the light cones. With this, relative simultaneity is no longer a possibility. 
Stein argues that the individual at the origin of the frame of reference is only able to determine 
temporal locations for themselves and their light cones. Nothing can be rightly asserted about 
temporal relations between spatially separated locations; it is impossible for me to rightly assert 
anything about the temporal relations between spatially separated events. It should also be noted 
that, as with Tooley, Stein is not defending Presentism but his defence could be adopted by 
Presentism. (Dainton, 2001, pp. 272-273)  
Those who attempt to produce a presentist theory compatible with STR have to explain the 
connection between existence and presentness. What is present is different depending on the frame 
of reference and reality must be explained in this context. The Eternalist is not faced with the same 
problem. Reality is not dependent on temporal location. Unlike the presentist, if an actual object is 
real then it does not have to be present. Relative simultaneity is perfectly compatible with their 
theory of time. Differing times can be present from different frames of reference but each event, 
regardless of temporal location, exists.  There is a connection between existence and temporal 
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location for presentism. Relative simultaneity means that existence and temporal ordering of events 
do not align. One possible way to respond is to relativize existence along with the present. Not only 
is simultaneity relative but so too is existence. What exists from each frame of reference depends on 
the relative motion between the event and the observer. This appears more like an argument 
against Presentism from absurdity. Regardless, the relation between present and existence must be 
adequately explained.  
2.0 Anti-Thesis 
2.1 Putnam & Stein  
2.1.1 Responses to Putnam 
I will mention three ways of responding to the Eternalist arguments. Each of these responses accepts 
that the present cannot be constructed independent of a frame of reference. In the context of the 
Minkowski space-time diagram, the present has to start from the centre point; from the frame of 
reference that the diagram represents. The first option is to assert that everything in the ‘dark zone’ 
is simultaneous with the centre point (Figure 2.0). Events might not be on the same horizontal axis 
but if they are located outside the future and past light cones they are also present. Events located 
at points c and d are both simultaneous with a.  
 
Figure 2.0 – 
 
 
 
 
 
This leads to a contradiction (Figure 2.1). An event that is not spatially separate from a is in the 
future, namely b. c is spatially separated. Therefore c is simultaneous with a. From the perspective of 
c, b is spatially separated and so simultaneous with c. The following is asserted at the same time: b is 
future and b is present. This cannot be allowed unless a relative idea of the present is adopted, 
which is self-defeating for the presentist doctrine. 
Present =  
a d 
c b 
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Figure 2.1 - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The second approach is to assert that only some spatially separate events are simultaneous with the 
centre point. For example, asserting that the horizontal axis is the grounding factor for the present. a 
and d are present (Figure 2.2). However, selecting particular set of events to be present creates a 
conflict; different events are present at the same time. This arises when there is relative motion 
between the two events that produce differing planes of simultaneity. From one frame of reference 
a and c are both present, as shown in the diagram. Having a single absolute present from each frame 
of reference cannot be the case. These presents must be relative and not absolute. Planes of 
simultaneity cannot be shown to run along a single universal axis. Both the plane of simultaneity 
between a and c is just as valid as between a and d. The resolution to this would be to assert a 
relative form of Presentism that, as previously noted, is self-defeating.  
 
Figure 2.2 - 
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The final approach is to assert that nothing in the ‘dark zone’ is simultaneous with the centre point, 
as is done by Stein. Stein (Stein, On Einstein--Minkowski Space--Time, 1968) rejects that the notion 
of present can be spatially extended. The issue that Putnam highlights assumes that the present 
includes spatial extension. For the present to be defined in a relativistic setting it must be restrained 
to the here-now.  (Figure 2.3) 
Figure 2.3 – 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1.3 Putnam’s Objection to Stein 
Putnam articulates an objection to Stein. He states that the following arises from Stein’s view: 
something can come to have existed without ever existing. Take a point that is outside the lower 
light cone from one frame of reference but at a future time will arrive inside it, a. (Figure 2.4) From 
the first frame of reference depicted, a is not present and does not exist. In the second frame of 
reference, a is in the past and existed. An event existed without ever existing. Things that were 
never real have been real. (Putnam, Time and Physical Geometry, 1967, p. 246)  
Putnam asserts that the view offered by Stein conflicts with a conceptual truth about time. The 
nature of time does not allow something to be past that was never present. The concept of being 
past is derived from things that were once present.  
  
Present =  
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Figure 2.4 - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1.4 Stein’s Response  
Stein does not think Putnam’s objection is valid. Instead Stein argues that all that Putnam has 
highlighted is the stark differences between pre and post relativistic space-time. If a spatially 
separate event has already become, then we have assumed a pre relativistic notion; notably that 
simultaneity extends across spatially separated events. Stein has already rejected this notion of 
simultaneity:  
‘If "presentness to each other" of events is taken to mean that each has, for the other, 
already become, then in pre relativistic theory we have the ordinary concept; but in Einstein 
Minkowski space-time an event's present is constituted by itself alone. In this theory, 
therefore, the present tense can never be applied correctly to "foreign" objects. This is at 
bottom a consequence (and a fairly obvious one) of our adopting relativistically invariant 
language – since, as we know, there is no relativistically invariant notion of simultaneity. The 
appearance of paradox only confirms that the space-time of Einstein and Minkowski is quite 
different from pre relativistic space-time.’ (Stein, On Einstein--Minkowski Space--Time, 1968, 
p. 15)  
Stein is simply pointing out how Putnam’s objection assumes a pre relativistic notion of simultaneity. 
As Stein does not make such an assumption, Putnam’s objection merely highlights how the concept 
of time must be drastically different post relativity. This kind of response is best articulated in the 
following: 
Present =  
Past =  
a 
a 
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‘Many of the objections and replies we will encounter have this general form. First, the 
presentist is urged to take relativistic space-time seriously. The presentist then makes a 
proposal about what his view comes to in a relativistic setting. An objection is then made to 
the presentist's proposal which is based on some principle from outside relativity theory, 
such as the principle that what is past was present, which fails to hold in the relativistic 
setting on the presentist's proposal. The presentist then replies that the principle's not 
holding is just what we should expect given the relativistic setting.’ (Hinchliff, 1998, p. 580) 
Judgments about temporal relations between spatially separated events are not applicable under 
Stein’s definition, as it is important to note: 
‘in Einstein Minkowski space-time an event's present is constituted by itself alone. In this 
theory, therefore, the present tense can never be applied correctly to "foreign" objects’ 
(Stein, On Einstein--Minkowski Space--Time, 1968, p. 15) 
In addition, Stein rejects Putnam’s claim concerning an objective connection between an event 
‘presently existing’ and it being ‘real’. Recall Putnam’s third condition offered earlier:  
‘III. If it is the case that all and only the things that stand in a certain relation R to me-now 
are real, and you-now are also real, then it is also the case that all and only the things that 
stand in the relation R to you-now are real.’ (Putnam, 1967, pp. 240-241) 
A ‘certain relation R’ is the simultaneity between two events. Putnam is claiming (in line with 
Einstein’s definition of simultaneity) that the observation of another spatially separated event is 
equal to that event being both present and real; being simultaneous grants objective reality. Stein 
rejects this claim on the grounds that it is assuming a relativistically invariant notion and that the 
present can only be constituted by itself alone. He writes: 
‘In fact, having stated the "man on the street's view" that "real" means "presently existing" 
and having correctly shown that this is incompatible with special relativity (if one assumes 
'real' to have an objective meaning – i.e., to be relativistically invariant), Putnam bases the 
rest of his discussion upon "our desire to preserve ... one-half" of that view: namely (cf. sec. 
II above), the principle that all presently existing things are real’ (Stein, On Einstein--
Minkowski Space--Time, 1968, p. 15) 
He continues, 
‘It is amusing to ask, Why not try to save the other half? If, indeed, instead of maintaining 
the implication "present implies real," we were to insist upon the converse – i.e., that only 
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things that exist now are real –, we should be led by an argument like Putnam's to conclude 
that for any event, it and it alone is real; and then, instead of the interesting result that 
special relativity implies determinism, we should have the interesting result that special 
relativity implies a peculiarly extreme (but pluralistic!) form of solipsism.’ (Stein, On Einstein-
-Minkowski Space--Time, 1968, p. 18) 
These passages from Stein leave us with a degree of uncertainty over what exactly the theory of 
time he is presenting entails. His remarks about assuming ‘real’ to have objective meaning leave 
much for discussion about what exactly he is suggesting in this passage. Additionally, he starts his 
discussion leading to a solipsistic position with, ‘It is amusing to ask’. This leaves the question open 
as to what exactly he is endorsing. Bourne (Bourne, 2006) offers three possibilities for interpreting 
Stein’s positive thesis.  
2.1.5 Minimalist, Relativistic and Solipsistic Interpretations  
The minimalist interpretation endorses Eternalism. Stein is offering a minimalistic interpretation of 
becoming and existence as Eternalists do. This claim is based on the idea that the here-now is the 
only way of conceiving the present in post-relative space time that makes sense. Bourne writes: 
‘The minimalist interpretation of becoming and existence is based on an argument from 
meaninglessness: it is based on the claim that the only notion of ‘present’ that makes sense 
in the context of Einstein-Minkowski space-time is that of the here-now. The idea then, 
according to this interpretation, is to say that, of any event, it is present relative to itself and 
to nothing else: it and it alone is present.’ (Bourne, 2006, p. 164) 
Stein furthers this interpretation: 
‘Let us turn now to the main arguments of Rietdijk and Putnam. The common fallacy of 
those arguments is their employment, in the context of the Einstein-Minkowski theory, of 
notions about time that are illegitimate in that theory… the Einstein Minkowski structure 
gives us (in a very clear mathematical sense) temporal relations, but no "time" simpliciter. In 
the context of special relativity, therefore, we cannot think of temporal evolution as the 
development of the world in time, but have to consider instead (as above) the more 
complicated structure constituted by, so to speak, the "chronological perspective" of each 
space-time point. The leading principle that connects this mathematical structure with the 
notions of "process" and "evolution" (and justifies the use of our notion of "becoming" in 
relativistic space-time) is this: At a space-time point a there can be cognizance of-or 
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information or influence propagated from-only such events as occur at points in the past of 
a.’  
Stein is presenting a view incompatible with Putnam and Rietdijk but his watered down version of 
becoming is not sufficient to distinguish it from their endorsements of Eternalism. Nothing of what is 
said about the present is adequate to make it incompatible with the Eternalist view. In fact, an 
Eternalist may happily subscribe to the version of becoming offered here. Nothing is distinctive 
about this version of becoming is incompatible with Eternalism. Stein is principally opposed to 
Putnam and the Eternalist doctrine but interpreting Stein in this way aligns the two positions. It is 
unlikely that Stein desired his positive thesis to result in such an association.  
The relativistic interpretation accepts reality to be a relativistically variant notion. Post relativistic 
time results in reality joining simultaneity as a relativistically variant notion. Just as each point in 
space-time has its own self-contained present; it also has its own self-contained reality. Bourne 
captures the nuance of this view: 
‘What exists for me is not necessarily what exists for you. What is wrong with that? Well, 
first, although we may think that existence can be relativized to some things, such as times, 
it sounds more like a bad joke to think that existence depends on how fast you’re going! But, 
nevertheless, it might well be argued that anyone who accepts STR will accept that 
simultaneity is frame-relative; so anyone entering into the spirit of special relativity will be 
happy to accept that existence itself is frame relative.’ (Bourne, 2006, p. 168) 
However, the support for endorsing this view is lacking. Interpreting Stein in this way leads to a 
conclusion about reality that he does not argue for. Granted, it might well be the case that reality is 
relative but this view should not be accepted without sufficient backing. Stein does not offer support 
for the relative interpretation. It is a difficult to see why these consequences should be accepted 
simply to make sense of the previous reasoning Stein has used. The Eternalist has no reason to adopt 
such a view. Equally, Eternalism is perfectly capable of avoiding such a result: 
‘Well, not quite! Tenseless theorists need not accept it. So because there is a theory 
available that does not lead to the conclusion that we must relativize existence itself, and 
because there are no other compelling reasons to relativize existence, tense theorists should 
not happily swallow this conclusion and take it to be a surprising discovery about existence, 
but should view it as an unwelcome consequence of adopting this solution.’ (Bourne, 2006, 
p. 168) 
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The solipsistic interpretation is the last understanding of Stein’s positive thesis that will be discussed. 
This view maintains that reality and presentness are interconnected as a proper tensed theorist 
would maintain. Reality is assumed to be as restricted as the present is; reality is to follow suit in line 
with Stein’s definition of the present. Recall that Stein asserts: 
‘in Einstein Minkowski space-time an event's present is constituted by itself alone. In this 
theory, therefore, the present tense can never be applied correctly to "foreign" objects’ 
(Stein, On Einstein--Minkowski Space--Time, 1968, p. 15) 
The solipsistic view takes the present to be spatially restricted. Granted, we often think of the 
present in a spatially limitless sense. But there is no reason for this, post relativity. The here-now is 
all that exists. Each here-now is all that can be granted existence. Stein offers support for this view:  
When a soldier at roll call responds "Present!" upon hearing his name, he is not merely 
announcing that he still exists; he means that he is on the spot. Now, in the theory of 
relativity, the only reasonable notion of "present to a space-time point" is that of the mere 
identity-relation: present to a given point is that point alone-literally "here-now"’ (Stein, 
1991, p. 159) 
Stein’s argument is not strong enough to affirm that the only way to conceive of the present as 
spatially contained. What we can conclude with certainty is that the notion of a here-now present is 
valid. The reasoning allows for us to understand the present in the here-now sense but doesn’t 
exclude any other expression of the present. Further support is needed for this: 
‘This argument certainly shows that we have a legitimate use for the notion of the here-now. 
But this argument does not show that the notion of the here-now is primary; less still does it 
show that we have no conception of the present extending beyond our spatial location.’ 
(Bourne, 2006, p. 170) 
The solipsistic interpretation, although producing some strange consequences, is how I shall take 
Stein’s positive thesis. It maintains Presentism and can express the ideals that a presentist wants to 
with ease. Becoming can be explained relative to each frame of reference. Everything which is in the 
upper light cone is in a state of non-existence and then becomes at the present; only that in your 
here-now is real and holds true to an objective definition of becoming. Reality is restricted to your 
frame of reference and only what becomes for you counts. Objectively, a spatially restricted reality 
becomes at your here-now.   
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However, this is not without difficulties. Note that the past is that in the lower light cone and Stein 
maintains that it is as real as the present. Exposition on why Stein holds these views and how they 
are problematic follows.  
2.2 Alternative to Stein  
2.2.1 Stein and the Past   
Stein makes two notable claims when he defines the past. Firstly, he claims that the past is defined 
as that which takes place in the lower light cone. What takes place in the observer’s lower light cone 
is said to be in the ‘absolute past’ of that observer, since those events are in that observer’s lower 
light cone in all frames of reference. Whilst it can be said that everything in another observer’s lower 
light cone is past for them and this is absolute, a judgement about the temporal location of a 
spatially separated event in another observer’s lower light cone relative to that frame of reference 
cannot be asserted. Secondly, he claims that the absolute past is as real as the present. This means 
that from each frame of reference everything found in the lower light cone is just as real as that at 
the present. These claims result from Stein arguing against Putnam and Rietdijk. (Stein, On Einstein--
Minkowski Space--Time, 1968, p. 16) 
Stein’s reasoning for defining the past as that which takes place in the lower light cone appears 
intuitive. The lower light cone is representative of possible information and knowledge that is 
accessible at the present. Cognizance of past events allows for temporal ordering. It is possible to 
assign a chronology to everything in the lower light cone. The lower light cone is the only area of 
space-time where this is possible. No observer can have perceptual knowledge of anything outside 
the lower light cone. It is impossible for such an epistemological connection outside the lower light 
cone and it is also impossible for anything outside of the upper light cone to become at the present. 
This claim aligns with Stein’s rejection of Putnam’s spatially extended definition of the present. Stein 
has already reduced the present to the here-now. Stein expresses this in terms of geometric 
positions: 
‘In the geometrical situation defined at the beginning of this section,1 the point c is not in 
the past of a (nor identical with a), and a is not in the past of c; therefore, no information or 
influence from or cognizance of either can occur at the other. This provides no warrant at all 
                                                          
1  ‘For any points a and b of Einstein-Minkowski space-time, there is a point c in space like relation to both: i.e., 
such that c is comparable neither with a nor with b under the chronological ordering.’ (Stein, On Einstein--
Minkowski Space--Time, 1968, p. 12) See figure 2.5 
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for the claim that the event at c must be "real" or "determinate" to an observer at a; and the 
fact that there is a time axis orthogonal to the direction from a to c (or a time-coordinate 
function having equal values at a and c) adds nothing. The relation of b to c is of course just 
the same; the existence, adduced by Rietdijk, of a time coordinate whose value is smaller at 
b than at c, does not put b – in the absolute, or physical, or relativistically invariant sense     
in the past of c, because "a time coordinate" is not "time." Neither a nor b is, in any 
physically significant sense, "present" (or past) for any observer at c – regardless of his 
velocity – for neither has already become for c (nor has c for them); but a has already 
become for b, and can influence it.’ (Stein, On Einstein--Minkowski Space--Time, 1968, p. 16) 
Figure 2.5 – 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2.2 Objection to Stein 
It would be good to recap the structure of the argument at this point. We started with STR endorsing 
Eternalism, embodied by the arguments of Putnam, Rietdijk and Penrose. Stein responds directly to 
Putnam and Rietdijk. Stein points out that a spatially extended present is incompatible with post 
relativistic space-time; consequently pointing out the fallacy of Putnam’s argument. Putnam argues 
that an event can come to have existed without ever existing. This, to Stein, is also a fallible 
objection, resolved by rejecting the assumption of a present incompatible with post relativistic 
space-time. However, this is where I take issue. I find Stein’s response to be unsatisfactory. He 
responds to Putnam by expressing the invalidity of his argument. The present in post relativistic 
space-time is not spatially extended. This is how Stein assumes Putnam to be mistaken. Recall Stein’s 
assertion: 
‘If "presentness to each other" of events is taken to mean that each has, for the other, 
already become, then in pre relativistic theory we have the ordinary concept; but in Einstein 
a 
b 
c 
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Minkowski space-time an event's present is constituted by itself alone. In this theory, 
therefore, the present tense can never be applied correctly to "foreign" objects.’ (Stein, On 
Einstein--Minkowski Space--Time, 1968, p. 16) 
However, this does not fully encompass the extent that the problem Putnam is raising. Stein believes 
that simply clarifying what constitutes the present in post relativistic space-time is sufficient for 
overcoming the objection. But even if the present does not extend to any other point on the 
Minkowski space-time diagram, it allows for an event never existing but at a future point to have 
existed (Figure 2.6). A spatially restricted present does not resolve the problem. The past for Stein is 
that which takes place in the lower light cone. This is something spatially extended and contains 
events and objects that are as real as the present. His views about the past allows it to contain real 
entities when, even under exclusive relativistic notions, they never were realised in the present.  
Making the present contained is irrelevant to resolving this problem. This issue is found in a 
discrepancy between defining the past as spatially extended and the present as spatially contained. 
Figure 2.6 - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The issue is a product of the way Stein has defined the extent of the past and present. In addition, 
his claims about the past’s reality must also be examined. Regardless of whether the past is real or 
not the issue remains. If the reality of the past is rejected, then the issue concerns how something 
that did never presently exist can have existed. If the reality of the past is accepted, then the issue 
concerns how something is real when it never became real at the present. Either way Stein fails to 
address Putnam’s objection. 
I shall offer clarity on the reality of the past and then produce a satisfactory response to Putnam’s 
objection.  In rejecting Stein a viable presentist position emerges. If the past contains objects that 
Present =  
Past =  
a 
a 
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exist then it is no longer the case that everything that exists is present. The past contains events that 
are not present but do exist. A response can still be produced that will accommodated a presentist 
mentality and it is in line with the starting position Stein has presented.  
2.2.3 The Reality of the Past 
Stein’s claims about the reality of the past are not sufficiently supported. An adaptation of his 
argument against Putnam’s spatially extended (and pre relativistic) concept of simultaneity can be 
applied to the past as well. 
If we take apart Stein’s argument, we can fully diagnose his mistake. Recall that Stein remarks the 
following in response Putnam’s assumptions about how simultaneity functions post relativity:  
‘The point c is not in the past of a (nor identical with a), and a is not in the past of c; 
therefore, no information or influence from or cognizance of either can occur at the other.’ 
(Stein, On Einstein--Minkowski Space--Time, 1968, p. 16)  
Note that knowledge of events is important. Possessing such information about events allows for an 
individual to create a temporal structure; to produce a chronology, in an absolute sense, of when an 
event occurred. Without such cognizance it is impossible to do this. An individual’s lower light cone 
is the only place where it is possible to accurately assign a temporal location for events. This is why 
the lower light cone is synonymous with the past.  
If the event exists outside of the lower light cone, it is impossible to deduce anything about the 
event’s reality or where it is located in time. Being in the lower light cone gives the event an absolute 
and set location relative to the observer. Stein affirms there to be a significant difference between 
the relation between events in the ‘dark zone’ and the relation concerning an event in the absolute 
past: 
‘Neither a nor b is, in any physically significant sense, "present" (or past) for any observer at 
c – regardless of his velocity – for neither has already become for c (nor has c for them); but 
a has already become for b, and can influence it.’ (Stein, On Einstein--Minkowski Space--
Time, 1968, p. 16) 
The important notion to understand is that Stein firmly holds there to be an objective difference 
between events in the absolute past and events located outside the lower light cone. The past and 
present are all of which an observer is capable of possessing knowledge and this is what grants 
reality.  
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However, this view is not grounded by sufficiently strong support. Stein’s requirement is such that 
the absolute past is somehow under the influence of the present event; cognizance and information 
being accessible. The ability to create a chronology, assigning a temporal location to an event is the 
basis of Stein’s argument. He shows how the lower light cone is the only place where this is possible. 
The knowledge an observer possesses permits them the ability to create a temporally ordered 
structure. It seems that it must also be necessary to show how this form of influence translates into 
reality. Simply possessing knowledge about the past is independent of the issue of whether past 
events are real. Simply knowing something does not result in the object in question existing. Being 
able to create a chronology of events is equally irrelevant to those events being real. Actual events 
are not real merely in virtue of being temporally ordered. Stein would require an additional 
argument that justifies his claim about the reality of the past. As he does not provide such an 
argument, there is no need to follow Stein when he subscribes to the reality of past objects and 
events.  
2.2.4 The Extent of the Past 
To resolve the problem raised by Putnam, the discrepancy between what constitutes the past and 
the present must be resolved. The problem arises because the present is reduced to a small point of 
here-now in the centre of the Minkowski space-time diagram while the past is extended to an entire 
quadrant of the diagram. An entity can easily avoid passing through the narrow present and enter 
into the protracted past. Two recognizable solutions are appropriate. We either reduce the past to a 
smaller entity or extend the present to envelop the past. Both solutions must ensure that any entity 
located in the future is not capable of being located in the past at a future time without first being 
located at the present. The present must exist as a border between the future and past ensuring 
that the migration of entities from future to past goes through the present.  Two positions follow 
which are capable of resolving these problems: Cone Presentism and Point Presentism with a 
localised past. 
Cone Presentism resolves the problem by extending the present beyond a point; namely, along the 
light cones (Figure 2.7). Two things are simultaneous when one exists on the light cone of another 
(Godfrey-Smith, 1979). This resolves the problem by increasing the size of the present to encase the 
past. Everything in the lower light cone has the present at its border. Nothing is capable of moving 
into the past without first entering the present. Things are no longer able to have existed without 
ever existing. 
  
33 
 
Figure 2.7 – 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Localising the past with point Presentism reduces the scope of the past. This is done by reducing the 
past to that which was in the observer’s here-now’. (Figure 2.8).This remedies the discrepancy 
between the past and present by making only that which was realised in the observer’s here-now 
constitute this past. This localised past can always affirm the past to have once been present. Only 
events and objects that have been realised at the present will have existed. Becoming is contained 
to the progression of here-now’s. Those things which become at present are all that can be claimed 
to have existed when they are no longer present. As all presentness is contained within the object 
itself, every object will have its own here-now present and its own pathway through previous here-
now’s (the object’s so-called ‘worldline’ determines what is and was real for that object). 
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2.2.5 Point Presentism & the Past 
Out of the two possible solutions, I find point Presentism with a localised past to be the preferable 
option. Cone Presentism is subject to an objection by Savitt. Under the cone presentist model, 
events that we know to be temporally distant are aligned with the present. Cosmic background 
radiation exists in the light cone of everyone on earth but its source is the big bang. The big bang is 
temporally distant from us right now but the cone model makes it simultaneous with us. (Savitt, 
2000, p. 6) In addition to wanting to avoid this objection, an argument for accepting the present to 
be contained is found in empiricism. What we have justification for does not extend beyond a single 
point. More will be said on this reasoning in the following section. 
2.2.6 Point Presentism 
Point Presentism is the resultant theory of adopting this solution to Putnam and interpreting Stein in 
a solipsistic way. The view I offer is similar to the one Stein offers but is distinct when concerned 
with the characterisation of the past. The nature of the present is contained simply to the point on 
which the frame of reference is centred. For us as humans it is entailed by taking a strict 
justificationist position that the frame of reference is restricted to the mind. Every observation that 
we call present is the current interpreted mental picture. The past takes the same form as the 
present; a series of mental phenomena that were previously a part of your present mind-set. Each 
individual is capable of creating a chronology on past presents. It is beyond the scope of this 
discussion to state how memories are forms that link current experience to previous experiences in 
such a way that an ordering of events could be created. However, later in the investigation (See 
3.3.4) a brief sketch of an account is given. 
Expressing this view on a Minkowski space-time diagram will provide some clarity (Figure 2.9). The 
line a, represents the observer, b’s, progression through time. Each point on the line from c to b and 
towards a are progressing points that either were once present or will become present for the 
observer. Adopting Justificationism in that way I have presented entails the present to be restricted 
to the mental state of observer b. Nothing else is present. When the observer was located at c the 
event located at d is within the light cones. A mental representation of d can be a part of the present 
at c. The actual event located at d is irrelevant to what is present at c. Only a phenomenal 
representation of d can be present at c. The event e is outside of the light cones for c and therefore 
no belief concerning the existence of e could be justified. At b both e and d are within the light 
cones. A belief about their existence can be justified. At b a mental representation of events located 
at both d and e can be present. Anything actually occurring at any location spatially separated is 
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neither a part of any present or past for the observer. What is present for b is simply a mental 
representation of events located at d and e. What is past for b is that located at c. All that was 
located at c was the mental representations of events within the light cones. A mental 
representation of e is not past for b but is a part of the present at b as e is located on the lower light 
cone of b.  
Point presentism is the theory that asserts the present to be that which is here-now. The past is 
restricted to the same form as the present; a pathway through previous here-nows. All that 
constitutes the past is that which was present. The present is entirely contained to the mind; all that 
was present was phenomenal so all that is past is also phenomenal. Whatever the past mental states 
that can be justified from your here-now are all that constitutes the past.  
Figure 2.9 –  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This is a strong conclusion to reach and will not stand up to scrutiny unless extensive support is 
offered. Justificationist ideology provides this support when taken with empiricism. Putnam relies on 
physics to determine the ontology of time. In assuming justificationism, his argument that empirical 
methods and constrictions determine the ontology should also lead to the adoption of point 
presentism.   
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3.0 Positive Thesis  
3.1 Justificationism& Empiricism 
3.1.1 Justification for a Spatially Contained Present 
All three endorsements of Eternalism stated in this investigation (in section 1.6) assume that the 
present is spatially extended beyond events located at the centre of a frame of reference. Stein 
rejects this notion but as previously noted (section 2.1.5) he has no argument against a Presentist or 
Eternalist who says it does make sense. Justificationism can be implemented here underpin Stein’s 
position. Remaining true to the aim of this investigation, nothing is to be included in the 
metaphysical picture of time that is not justified from evidence. Only presently accessible 
information can be included in a definition of simultaneity. When we take a proper empirical stance 
on presently accessible information, a spatially contained present is all that we can justify. Einstein 
defined simultaneity by referencing two spatially separated events. The observations of which 
provided the total justification for their simultaneity; simultaneous observations equated to the 
actual simultaneity of those events. In this definition, Einstein asserts that you can determine the 
simultaneity of two spatially separated events so long as you are in the middle of them. 
Our observations of the spatially separate are observations of the object’s past state. Our 
observations are based on the present light we perceive but this does not equate to the present 
state of the object. The information we decipher from light and interpret is of an object’s past state. 
For us, the actual spatially separated object is not to be equated with the corresponding mental 
phenomena that represent it. All that is present is a singular event; a temporally and spatially 
contained conscious experience. The information presently conveyed by light does not entail any 
other object’s present state.  
For example, suppose that a table has spontaneously come into existence in a location spatially 
separate from two observers (Figure 3.0). Light takes one second to travel from the table to the first 
observer a and two seconds to travel to the second observer b. The table shall be assigned three 
temporal states. One for each frame of reference we have taken. At the point of creation, t0. After 
one second, t1 and after two seconds, t2.  
Figure 3.0 – 
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When the table is first comes into existence neither a nor b can possibly assert anything about it. 
After one second it becomes possible for a to perceive the table. However, the perception will be of 
the table as it was at t0 not as it is at t1. It is impossible for a at t1 to assert anything about the table 
as it is at t1 because the light cannot have reached the spatio-temporal location at a. After two 
seconds it becomes possible for b to perceive the table as it was at t0 and for a to perceive the table 
as it was at t1. Asserting that the perception is of the present state of the object (After 2 seconds b 
perceives the state of the table at t2) implies an impossible instantaneous connection with the 
spatially separated object.  
A point of present is all that remains after justifying from empirical evidence. The spatio-temporal 
location of ‘now’ is confined to the centre of the frame of reference. For us, as humans, this means 
that the present is restricted to a current mental state. The collection of things to be included as 
present can only be made up of a single conscious experience. ‘Now’ refers to what you currently 
experience; only that which it is possible to justify at your present can be included in any single 
present moment. Working in line with justificationist ideology, we can conclude that: when it is 
impossible to justify the actual existence of an event or object we cannot conclude that those events 
or objects exist. It is impossible to justify present existence beyond each point and so all that we can 
claim exists is that located at a singular point of present.  
3.1.2 Revised Definition of Simultaneity   
A revised definition of simultaneity is required in line with the results of this investigation so far. 
Recall that Einstein has only one requirement for two events to be simultaneous, simultaneous 
observation. Being able to verify is the central notion that he requires the observer satisfy. When 
observers produce conflicting accounts of the present, he concludes with the relativity of 
simultaneity. Einstein’s verificationist assumptions are not to be rejected. In fact they are to be fully 
embraced; not only should we accept them but further them. Einstein’s notion, that two 
observations made at the same time are simultaneous, still holds. What must change is the 
connection these observations have to the actual world. When a claim is made that two events are 
simultaneous, all that is being discussed are the cognitive perceptions exclusively. Two mental 
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phenomena apart of the same conscious experience are simultaneous.  The present is not spatially 
extended and does not include anything beyond a single point; empiricism prevents this.   
Take the example previously offered by Einstein concerning two flashes of light on a train (explained 
in 1.5.1). For one observer the flashes are simultaneous and for the other they are not. In Einstein’s 
account it is important to remedy the conflicting accounts because reference is being made to the 
actual spatially separated events. However, once you accept that your experience is contained to a 
point, there is no issue. One experience determining that the light flashes are simultaneous has 
nothing to do with what any other observer experiences. Experiences do not determine the actual 
simultaneity between any spatially separated events. An experience is restricted to a single point 
and says nothing about any event beyond that point. For the observer asserting that the light flashes 
are simultaneous, the assertion is to be reduced to the following: my experience is of the light 
flashes being simultaneous.  As experience is contained to the mind and nothing is being said 
concerning the actual events’  simultaneity. To conclude that an experience determines the 
simultaneity of two spatially separated events would be incorrect. Instead, two conflicting accounts 
cannot say anything about the simultaneity (or lack of) between the light flashes; their experiences 
do not provide sufficient support for this.  
3.1.3 Unjustified Eternalism   
The relativity of simultaneity was the driving force behind endorsements of Eternalism based on 
empirical evidence (section 1.6). With a revised definition of simultaneity, there is no reason to 
adopt relative simultaneity. This removes a necessary premise from the arguments for Eternalism. 
Take Putnam’s argument, which involved four premises. The last assumes STR, as defined by 
Einstein, including the way he defined simultaneity. Without this premise, there is no discrepancy 
between what one observer asserts as past and another as present. The existence of future events 
from any single frame of reference is no longer presently justified from another frame of reference. 
A spatially extended present is required along with relative simultaneity to make any claims 
concerning events in one observer’s future already existing. Additionally, Rietdijk’s argument no 
longer follows. He argues that the events I call present can be past to another. When Einstein’s 
simultaneity and a spatially extended present are removed, he offers nothing to endorse Eternalism. 
This form of response is somewhat anticipated by Rietdijk as he accepts that: ‘an extreme positivism: 
"that which cannot yet be observed does not yet exist", can possibly withstand the conclusion 
concerned’ (Rietdijk, 1966, p. 343) Finally, Penrose suffers the same form of refutation. What is 
striking about Penrose’s argument is how he accepts that at the present spatially separated events 
are unjustifiable:  
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‘In fact neither of the people can yet know of the launching of the space fleet. They can 
know only later, when telescopic observations from earth reveal that the fleet is indeed on 
its way’ (Penrose, 1989, pp. 392–393) 
In arguing from a justificationist stance, anything beyond the possibility of justification should be 
disregarded. It is impossible to observe anything presently occurring in another galaxy, so it does not 
follow that anything occurring there is presently simultaneous with what is occurring here on earth. 
It should not be accepted that things exist when they cannot be justified. All we could possibly have 
justification for is provided by experiences here on earth.  
3.1.4 Justified Point Presentism   
Empiricism and Justificationism leaves us with simply a point of present as possibly justifiable. This is 
how we justify Stein’s claims concerning a spatially contained present. Stein offered a definition of 
the present that restricted it to the present but he has no argument against a presentist or eternalist 
who says it does make sense (section 2.1.5). Justificationism provides this support. Most 
importantly, it should be noted that the support for a spatially contained present comes from the 
same line of reasoning used to endorse Eternalism from empirical grounds in STR. The arguments 
against Presentism shown in this investigation were based on justifying from evidence; starting from 
physics and then following what view of time we arrive at. Putnam even went as far as to disregard 
the philosophical dialogue as being relevant to arriving at that outcome. Physics taken with 
Justificationism alone provided a definitive answer.  
Eternalism seems to overstep what is empirically justifiable and Point Presentism conforms to it. 
Putnam, Rietdijk, Penrose and any individual who accepted empirical justification to be important 
will find Point Presentism obeys the consequences of empirical justification and Eternalism does not. 
I have not altered the method of how these individuals arrived at their conclusions but instead fully 
endorsed this form of justification. What has changed is the accuracy of what we are able to justify. I 
have removed things that are impossible to justify but left the full extent of everything that can 
possibly be presently justified. What we have discovered is that instead of Eternalism being the 
theory that is fully justified from empirical evidence it is instead Point Presentism. When taking 
everything that can be possibly justified as being a part of a present we have justification for Point 
Presentism.  
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3.2 Beyond Justification  
3.2.1 Justificationism and Existence 
As present beliefs are all that we are capable of justifying there is much to explain about beliefs 
concerning things beyond the present. Our experiences provide justification for the truth of a belief. 
If we have an experience that justifies a belief then we can conclude with the belief being true; 
where there is not an experience providing justification, the truth of a belief cannot be held. 
Discussion is required of what can be said about everything beyond our current instant of mental 
experience. It should be noted here that Justificationism has so far been used exclusively to affirm 
what exists. A belief, in the existence of an event or object, is only held as true if it is possible to 
justify the belief. If such justification is impossible then we cannot assert existence. I will detail two 
options for explaining the unjustifiable. The first I will call the strong interpretation and the latter the 
weak interpretation.  
3.2.2 Strong Justificationism   
The stronger view takes our experiences to provide justification for beliefs that encompass the 
extent of existence. That which cannot be justified cannot be true. If justification cannot be provided 
for a belief then it cannot be true. Strong justificationism assumes that experience is the basis for 
existence; if a belief cannot be justified from experience then the belief cannot be true. 
Epistemology is the only factor driving ontology. Beyond experience there is no possible existence as 
it cannot be justified. The extent of the world is determined by what can be justified. What we 
experience encompasses the ontological; those beliefs that are justifiable contain the extent of true 
beliefs. As these justifiable beliefs are restricted to the present and the present is simply a point, all 
that exists is the here-now and everything beyond that does not exist.  
The ‘dark zones’ and future resemble areas of space-time beyond the outer most limitations of 
possible justification. The localised past can be justified based on present evidence but this does 
nothing to justify the actual existence of any event or object located in the past. There is no way of 
claiming anything in these areas exists from our frame of reference. Therefore, nothing located in 
those areas presently exists. An observation of an object that is not here-now is explained as present 
tense mental phenomena. What is justifiable never extends beyond any point. So everything beyond 
that point is non-existent. You could endorse strong Justificationism and defend the consequences 
adequately but it is not the only option, the weaker alternative can be just as effective.  
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3.2.3 Weak Justificationism  
The alternative is to adopt a weaker version of Justificationism. When experience is not sufficient to 
provide justification for the truth of a statement the result is not to assert that the belief cannot be 
true. We arrive at a weaker view by reducing the connection between epistemology and ontology. 
Justification provides only part of the picture. Our experiences do no encompass the extent of 
existence, as much beyond experience might exist. Every belief that is justified is true but not every 
belief that is true has the possibility of being justified:  if it is justifiable then it is true but if it is true 
then it is not necessarily justifiable.   
We are not justified in asserting truth to any belief referring to objects found in the ‘dark zones’ but 
that does not mean that we should conclude that they do not exist. It means that we cannot say if 
those beliefs are justified or not. An agnostic position is required. Beliefs about objects existing in 
places we can never justify may well be true but we cannot make such assertions. What we can say 
is that those beliefs for which my experience does not provide justification cannot be determined to 
be true of false. As our frame of reference will never allow for the justification of certain beliefs, we 
do not assert that the referent of those beliefs are non-existence but instead remain agnostic. This is 
distinct from the strong interpretation because our experience does not definitively provided 
justification for all true beliefs.  
Assertions about the existence of events in the lower light cone cannot be true but you say some 
true things concerning past events. If there is presently accessible evidence justifies a statement 
about the past then it is true. For example, if you hold an accurate memory that yesterday you were 
eating a cake. There is present evidence, located in the here-now, that supports assertion that 
yesterday you was eating cake. So the assertion is true. If you do not possess present evidence to 
support this assertion that the conclusion is agnosticism; the assertion is not false. You just do not 
have sufficient justification to hold the statement.  
Van Fraassen (van Fraassen, 1998) defines a form of agnosticism that parallels with the weak version 
of justificationism I am offering here. A distinction is made between scientific gnostic and scientific 
agonistic positions. A gnostic believes that the scientific beliefs they hold are true. The agonistic 
believes that the scientific beliefs they hold are empirically adequate but does not believe them to 
be true nor do they believe them to be false. Van Fraassen suggests in situations where there are 
unobservable entities that we should remain agonistic concerning a belief about their truth: 
‘The first agnostic I envisage says: 'I accept theory T, I believe it to be empirically adequate, 
but look – T also postulates some unobservable entities. Their existence is not required for 
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T's empirical adequacy, and I have no opinion at all about whether those entities exist.' The 
second is a slightly more sophisticated colleague, who begins instead with: 'I accept T in a 
qualified way, I have my subjective probabilities for its empirical adequacy, for the putative 
empirical evidence, and for certain rivals of T, but look - ...' (ending the same way).’ (van 
Fraassen, 1998, p. 214) 
Empirical adequacy does not play a part in position I am articulating. What is to be taken from van 
Fraassen is the notion of agnosticism. Agnosticism is to be understood as having no opinion 
concerning the truth of beliefs that are impossible to justify. If there is no way of accurately deciding 
whether or not a belief is true of false neither is assigned. In contrast to the strong view where if 
there is no empirical justification then the conclusion is that the belief in question is not true. 
However, it appears plausible for there to be a dissonance between what our experiences justify and 
whether or not a belief is true or false. Not having access to the necessary empirical evidence only 
rules out claims affirming the truth of a belief but does not necessarily affirm falsity. Under this view 
a truth value is not assigned to unjustifiable beliefs. 
To assert that something does not exist has the same requirements as asserting its existence. A 
suitable associate to evidence is required supporting the claim to non-existence. Suppose that 
hidden under the earth is the fossilised remains of an undiscovered dinosaur. It is located in such a 
position that at our current level of technological advancement it is impossible to discover. This does 
not mean that it does not exist. What it means is that we have no way of justifying the 
corresponding existence statements. There is the possibility of this entity existing here but no one is 
making this claim. We should not claim that it does not exist; instead, we should never make claims 
about it.  
3.3 Problems for Point Presentism  
3.3.1 Problems with Justificationism    
Both the weak and strong interpretations of Justificationism have problems. Adopting a weak 
version of Justificationism results in an inability to distinguish between futures, pasts and the ‘dark 
zones’; the result of weak Justificationism is agnosticism concerning all spatially and temporally 
separated events. When adopting this version of Justificationism it applies to everything that cannot 
be justified. This includes beliefs about events in the future and past. For the presentist, events 
located in the future and past do not exist. Actual events located at the present are all that exist. 
Even though beliefs about events in the future and past cannot be justified it is not the case that 
they are not true. Weak Justificationism means that we can only affirm truth to that which is 
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justified. It is not the case that an unjustified event does not exist. There is nothing to be said about 
whether a corresponding object or event of an unjustified belief exists or does not exist. The 
problem is that events in the future and past could exist even though the corresponding beliefs are 
unjustified. Just like beliefs concerning the unjustified ‘dark zone’ those beliefs about the future and 
past are also granted an agnostic status. Existence simply cannot be defined beyond that which is 
present. Global agnosticism results; previous events that the presentist would have agreed do not 
exist have the possibility of existing.  
The result of applying Justificationism to the empirical evidence leads us to either of these 
conclusions. Depending on how strong you want your Justificationism to be, the result is either a 
point of existence or a global agnosticism. It should be noted that reaching these points is simply the 
result of applying Justificationism, along with empirical thought, to the scientific evidence. The point 
being that whatever you say, Eternalism is shown to overstep the mark. 
3.3.2 Semantical Issues  
Presentism is also quite commonly objected for issues pertaining to semantics. More than what is 
present can be discussed but if all that exists is what is present, what makes talk about that beyond 
the present meaningful? The objection is simply: how can expressions have meaning when they 
refer to something that does not exist: 
‘One problem has to do with what appears to be perfectly meaningful talk about non-
present objects, such as Socrates and the year 3000. If there really are no non-present 
objects, then it is hard to see what we are referring to when we use expressions such as 
‘Socrates’ and ‘the year 3000’’ (Markosian, 2016) 
Point Presentism is capable of resolving this objection. All that exists is that which is present. The 
same is true for everything that you have the possibility of referencing. It is not the case that when 
an individual speaks of ‘Socrates’ they are referring to a non-present entity. They are simply 
referring to a present mental concept. When we discuss Socrates, reference is only ever made to our 
present knowledge. It would be impossible for us to include in any discussion, pertaining to Socrates, 
anything beyond present knowledge. This is far from a fully developed defence of the response but 
is stated here to give an idea of the way in which I would try to respond. Markosian also objects to 
Presentism on grounds for making sense of the relations between non-present objects: 
‘Another problem for the Presentist has to do with relations involving non-present objects. It 
is natural to say, for example, that Abraham Lincoln was taller than Napoleon Bonaparte, 
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and that World War II was a cause of the end of The Depression. But how can we make 
sense of such talk, if there really are no non-present objects?’ (Markosian, 2016) 
To make sense of such talk we have to first accept that all objects and events referred to are 
present. When someone produces the claim, ‘Abraham Lincoln was taller than Napoleon Bonaparte’, 
a discussion is being held concerning present beliefs exclusively. These present beliefs concern the 
height of Abraham Lincoln and Napoleon Bonaparte. The speaker has a belief that a certain person 
was a certain height. The referent of the belief might not be present but the belief about the height 
of those individuals is.  
From here someone assuming a strong justificationist stance can argue the following. These beliefs 
are true if there is presently accessible information that justifies the belief. There are present mental 
concepts that justify the height of the two individuals the beliefs concern. The two beliefs held by 
the individual are the height of Abraham Lincoln and the height of Napoleon Bonaparte. They are 
true because of the presently accessible information providing justification. From this you can 
produce a third belief. If the present belief of the height of Abraham Lincoln affirms a greater height 
than the present belief affirms to the height of Napoleon Bonaparte then it follows that the present 
belief ‘Abraham Lincoln was taller than Napoleon Bonaparte’ is also justified and true. This is done 
without reference to anything beyond presently justified beliefs. The weak justificationist can take 
the same approach but remains agonistic over what exactly makes a statement true. The beliefs can 
still be held because there is presently accessible evidence that justifies holding the belief. What 
actually makes the belief true is irrelevant. The same argument can be made because the beliefs are 
justified by evidence regardless of whether or not they are true. To parallel van Fraassen, the claim is 
that you accept that Lincoln is taller than Napoleon but you remain agonistic when concerned with 
the truth of such a claim.  
3.3.3 Truth-makers 
To resolve the previous semantical issues for Presentism, clarity was all that we required concerning 
the referent of an expression; notably that all terms refer to presently existing events and objects. 
Again I will note that this is far from a fully developed defence of the response but is stated here to 
give an idea of the way in which I would try to respond. However, there is a more substantial issue 
when concerned with what makes a statement true:  
‘A third problem for the Presentist has to do with the very plausible principle that for every 
truth, there is a truth-maker. The problem is that it is hard to see what the truth-makers 
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could be for such truths as that there were dinosaurs and that there will be Martian 
outposts.’ (Markosian, 2016) 
The response to this issue varies depending on whether or not you follow strong or weak 
justificationism. The strong justificationism can respond as follows. Right now, the presentist will 
accept that dinosaurs do not presently exist. What then makes a statement such as ‘it is true that 
dinosaurs existed’ true? The claim that a past tense statement is true is so because there is presently 
accessible information that supports it. Remember, that point presentist here is solipsistic; you are 
the definitive authority of what is past. Only that which is in your present is all that is present. When 
talking about the existence of dinosaurs, reference is never made to anything beyond that which is 
possible to presently access. The information currently accessible to any individual is such that there 
is sufficient justification for us to produce the claim that dinosaurs existed. If the presently accessible 
information is sufficient to warrant the possible justification of a statement being true then we can 
conclude that it is true. There have never been any direct observations of dinosaurs. The reason we 
accept that they existed is because at the present is it possible for their existence to be justified. 
Fossils provide part of this justification. Their existence can be a part of our presents. It is possible 
for you to presently perceive a fossil. In turn, the scientific knowledge that is produced from this 
presently accessible information allows for us, in accepting the conclusions that scientists reach, to 
assign a truth value to the past existence of dinosaurs.  
The referent of any statement is simply a mental phenomenon. If there is sufficient empirical data 
available to provide justification then that is all that is required for a truth-maker. Justification based 
on presently accessible information is able to provide an extensive list of truth-makers for everything 
that can possibly be a part of any individual’s present. When I produce the statement, ‘that chair 
exists’, it can be true because there is possible justification for its existence. But as all that can 
possibly be presently justified is the mental state representing the past state of the object, the truth 
evaluation can only presently refer to a mental state. So when I produce the statement concerning 
the present existence of any actual spatially separated object the evaluation can never be true. It is 
true that I am presently aware of a certain conscious phenomena; it is true that I have a mental 
representation when I perceive a chair.  
The approach of weak justificationism requires less philosophical manoeuvring. The weak 
justificationist is capable of remaining agnostic concerning what makes a statement true. They do 
not have to provide a definitive collection of truth makers for every statement. Instead they can 
continue to assert statements without truth makers because there is presently accessible 
information that provides justification. The accessible evidence is sufficient to support the holding of 
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a belief but it does nothing to assert its truth. The objection to the presentist concerned what makes 
a true statement true when there is no evidence. Unlike the strong justificationist, who holds that 
only justified beliefs are true, the weak justificationist asserts that the statement does not have to 
be justified to be held. They do not have to make a claim concerning what makes a statement true. 
Agnosticism can be held in regard to the truth-makers themselves.  
3.3.4 Explaining Instantaneous Change  
The point presentist should have a sufficient account that explains how things change. Explaining 
change is important if the present is to retain its dynamic and flowing element. Point Presentism 
only sustains an instantaneous point of existence. The general objection is as follows: how can 
change occur if only one thing exists? The intuitive position is that for something to change we 
require more than one thing. This is often an objection to Eternalism. As Point Presentism maintains 
that all that exists is a single point then a similar objection that applies to Eternalism applies to it 
too: 
‘William James (James, 1890) argued for the specious present on the grounds that a 
succession of experiences is not sufficient for an experience of succession. The idea, roughly, 
is that if change involves a succession of states then the perception of it must encompass 
more than an instant. According to the [Eternalist] change consists merely in there being one 
state of affairs at one time and a different state of affairs at another time.’ (Prosser, 2011, p. 
96) 
The objection raised here suggests that an Eternalist is not capable of adequately explaining change 
as all there is to change is being in one state of affairs at one time and then being in a differing state 
of affairs at another time. Point Presentism is in a remarkably similar situation. Change must be 
explained within a single point and any given time. Prosser (Prosser, 2011) suggests a solution to this 
problem that we can apply to Point Presentism. He first offers an account of the phenomenal 
interaction our minds have with actual objects:  
‘Consider a normally-sighted subject looking at a square object. The subject has a visual 
experience with a ‘square’ phenomenal character. Suppose we wish to explain why the 
subject’s experience has that phenomenal character. What we say will depend on the nature 
of the explanatory project. One may, for example, pose a question like this in the course of 
developing a full explanation of phenomenal consciousness. But sometimes something far 
more modest will suffice. Suppose, for example, that we merely wanted to know why the 
subject was experiencing a ‘square’ phenomenal character rather than, say, a ‘triangular’ 
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phenomenal character. For some such purposes a sufficient answer might be: ‘because the 
subject’s experience represents a square’.’ (Prosser, 2011, p. 99) 
Each object has its own mental representation. It is so because the experience is representative of 
the actual object being perceived. This singular mental percept is then combined as a method of 
efficiencies used by the human mind that produces change:  
‘Imagine first watching a slow sequence of images, slow enough that they are experienced 
as a series of distinct objects appearing and disappearing, one after the other. There is no 
persistence, and nothing moves. Imagine now the whole series repeated many times, with 
each repeated sequence quicker than the last. At some point a threshold is reached at which 
one’s perception switches and one seems instead to perceive a single moving object. At this 
point there is a clear change in the phenomenology. This, I suggest, is the point at which 
one’s experience represents an enduring object instead of a series of distinct short-lived 
objects. It is no coincidence that this is also the point at which one starts to experience 
motion (change of position), as well as other changes in the moving object (if successive still 
images differ in colour, for example, then one experiences a moving object that changes 
colour). One’s perceptual system is ‘lazy’ – it no longer ‘bothers’ to separate the still images 
as separate identities and instead puts them together as one single moving object, 
numerically identical throughout.’ (Prosser, 2011, pp. 116-117) 
Prosser’s suggestion here explains how phenomenal experience explains how a single moving object 
is derived from a number of separate still ones. This offers assistance to the Eternalist as their theory 
rejects any form a dynamism as an objective part of time. The solution offered explains why we can 
perceive of change and dynamic motion when time itself is in fact static. The Point Presentist is 
capable of including dynamic and flowing aspects as an objective part of time. Unlike the Eternalist 
model, there is only one single point of time. Our perceptions of time is of each single time flowing 
from one to the next. As Prosser suggested, the mind is producing a phenomenological 
representation of this flow. But instead of it being produced from a series of static times, one after 
the other, the mental representation is produced from a single flowing present coupled with the 
memory of past presents. As the present flows from each point to the next, we hold in recollection 
the previous points of present that we were in. As the present flows the current present along with 
the previous remain conscious. This produces a phenomenal representation of the objectively 
dynamic nature of time.  What we perceive as time flowing is an accurate representation of time 
actually flowing. 
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Experience is the fundamental basis used to construct the ontological features of time in this 
investigation. Change is one of these features. What we experience has to be sufficient in justifying a 
belief concerning the nature of time’s flow. An issue would result if our experience of time did not 
align with the metaphysical consequences from this investigation. Our experience is of time flowing 
and as such the ontology should reflect that to ensure continuity. Repurposing Prosser’s explanation 
of change for Point presentism allows for this.   
4.0 Conclusion  
4.1 Summary 
Others who offer views counter to Eternalism employ philosophical rebuffs. I have not taken this 
approach. I have argued that arguments for Eternalism from STR do not follow. Those who have 
previously argued that STR provides support for Eternalism have not properly employed 
Justificationism. When amendments are made to the Justificationist doctrine the result is not 
Eternalism but instead a form of Presentism. I have drawn from the same empirical evidence 
supplied by STR and drawn a conclusion supporting Point Presentism.  
Einstein offers a definition of simultaneity that asks for ‘now’ to include objects and events that 
could not possibly be justified. Observations tell us nothing of what is occurring now at any spatially 
separated location. When Justificationism was properly employed along with empiricism the result is 
‘now’ being restricted to mental phenomena. The argument for adopting relative simultaneity 
requires ‘now’ to be spatially extended. A fundamental premise, relative simultaneity, is removed 
from Putnam’s argument. Reformulating simultaneity in this way amounts to different people 
differing over their experiences of what is simultaneous with what. Someone asserting that a certain 
set of events are present in contention to the events I call present cannot draw any ontological 
conclusions from that. People can say different events are present but this has no bearing on the 
actual ontological state of the event. The argument based on justification from evidence supporting 
Eternalism now fails.  
What is left after the anti-thesis is how to properly articulate the resultant theory.  Point Presentism 
is akin to the positive thesis offered by Stein. Although offering an unambiguous account of such 
position was demanding and required substantial discussion, a solipsistic interpretation was chosen 
to be preferable. What was lacking from Stein was sufficient support for the present to be spatially 
contained. Such support was found in the consequences of justification based on evidence. The 
metaphysical picture offered by interpreting Stein in this way aligned with the consequences of 
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properly justifying from evidence. I supported this claim with a discussion concerning employing 
justificationist ideology. However, Stein’s position was not entirely acceptable. He offered a view of 
the past which conflicted with what is justifiable. So a localised version of the past was given; the 
past is that which was present and as all that was present is what is here-now, the past can only be 
what was here-then.  
A discussion of Justificationism was then held. Special consideration was given to what to make of 
that beyond justification. Two options were articulated. We either take justification to be strong and 
actively reject existence beyond the present or take it to be weak and accept an agnosticism to 
result. Either way has issues. Weak Justificationism creates dissonance between the epistemological 
basis and the ontological repercussions. The strong view leaves nothing occurring now beyond the 
frame of reference as existing. The choice between these holds much greater implications for the 
entirety of this investigation but they are not the only options. A number of conclusions can be 
reached.  
4.2 Possible Conclusions 
The first possible conclusion is to bite the bullet and accept that all that exists is the here-now. If it is 
truly accepted that the present is simply the here-now, in a solipsistic sense, then there should be no 
problem with this conclusion. The present is both spatially and temporally contained. Right now, the 
single point of my mind is all that exists. Existence might be lonely but it’s the logical conclusion of 
adopting strong Justificationism. Objections based on not wanting to be alone have to be 
disregarded. Hinchliff remarks on this kind of objection: 
‘The common objection to point Presentism is that it is lonely. Only the here-now exists. 
Though I am moved by this objection, I have often thought I should not be. It is really just a 
restatement of the view as an objection. It is like objecting to solipsism by saying the 
problem with solipsism is that there are no other people. Perhaps, though, in cases like 
these, an objection can be just a restatement of the view.’ (Hinchliff, 1998, p. 579) 
If someone does find this conclusion to be truly unpalatable, they could object by adopting the 
second possible conclusion. This is to reject a close association between epistemology and ontology. 
Weaker Justificationism might seem like it produces less unpalatable consequences. Existence is no 
longer restricted to a single point of here-now. Not being able to justify certain existence claims 
doesn’t equate to non-existence, so things beyond the here-now may still exist. However, this does 
mean that we can no longer be sure that the resultant ontology is a form of Presentism. Instead, 
everything that is located at the present exists along with an agnosticism regarding the existence of 
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all objects and events beyond the present. Conceding that events located beyond our present might 
exist means that the events located in the future and past might also exist. Someone who wants to 
defend Presentism will say something stronger. Additionally, someone who previously accepted a 
stronger view of Justificationism might be unhappy with this conclusion.  
The third possible conclusion is that there isn’t enough evidence that allows for a cohesive picture. 
Epistemological bases that can provide Justificationism might simply be too limited to result in the 
entire picture of time being expressed. Physics could advance and new evidence might come to light 
that has implications for the metaphysics of time. As it stands, the justified ontological implications 
are inconclusive because scientists have not provided a sufficient epistemological basis. However, 
this raises the question, why was it sufficient before Point Presentism was the outcome? Putnam, 
Rietdijk, Penrose and others accepted Eternalism on the same grounds. The confidence they held for 
their conclusion was so great that they gave Eternalism privilege as the only theory compatible with 
STR. It is acceptable for others to adopt this conclusion but those who previously accepted the 
consequences of Justificationism based on STR cannot reject it solely on the grounds that do not 
approve of the new conclusion.  
The final possible conclusion is that time is best explained by the philosophers and not the physicists. 
The notion of justifying time from evidence exclusively gives us a point of present. Point Presentism 
is an ontologically limited theory. It tells us very little about the ontology of time. An explanation of 
the concept of time is lacking. By adopting Point Presentism you have gained little further 
understanding of time beyond that your current mental experience is present. It might be all that we 
can justify is Point Presentism but if we reject that Justificationism should be that dominant thought 
when explaining time, the possibilities for offering a truly comprehensive explanation remains open.  
Regardless of which position one finds most attractive the important point to take away from this 
investigation is that Eternalism is not the justified position. Eternalism has held a privileged position; 
arguments have been made exclusively for Eternalism as justified from STR. In accepting the anti-
thesis, I have argued that Eternalism is not justified. What is justified is some form of Point 
Presentism. The form of which depends on the strength of Justificationism applied.  
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